The Relevance and Application of the Maxim Facultas Probationum Non Est Angustanda in the Polish Criminal Procedure

Abstract

Roman law constitutes the foundation of European legal culture and its principles – preserved in legal maxims and aphorisms – remain relevant within the Polish legal system. This article seeks to analyze the contemporary meaning and application of the Roman maxim facultas probationum non est angustanda (the possibility of presenting evidence must not be restricted) in the context of Polish criminal procedure. The aim of the study is to determine whether and to what extent this principle is reflected in the jurisprudence of criminal courts, as well as the degree to which its essence has been constrained by current procedural regulations.

The adopted research hypothesis assumes that the significance of the maxim has been narrowed in modern practice, and that judicial interpretation departs from its classical, Roman understanding. To verify this thesis, the study employs historical‑legal and dogmatic‑ legal methods, enabling the analysis of both Roman legal sources and contemporary case law. Additionally, functional and teleological methods were applied to examine how the principle of evidentiary freedom is implemented in procedural practice.

The analysis demonstrates that, although the maxim facultas probationum non est angustanda does not appear expressis verbis in statutory provisions, its substance is clearly reflected in the principles of Polish criminal proceedings – particularly in the parties’ right to initiate evidence and in the absence of a closed list of admissible evidentiary means. At the same time, numerous statutory restrictions – such as evidentiary prohibitions and the grounds for rejecting motions for evidence provided in Article 170 of the Code of Criminal Procedure – lead in practice to the limitation of the idea embodied in this maxim. In particular, the examination of Supreme Court and common court judgments confirms that evidentiary freedom is often curtailed for pragmatic reasons, thereby weakening the full realization of the Roman principle.

The article thus reveals that, although the Roman legal tradition continues to exert a strong influence on contemporary criminal law, its universal principles undergo reinterpretation and adaptation to the needs of modern procedure. Reflection upon the meaning of facultas probationum non est angustanda highlights the inherent tension between the ideal of material truth and procedural pragmatism, offering a contribution to the ongoing discourse on the boundaries of evidentiary initiative in criminal proceedings.