Hayek, common law and the theory of spontaneous order – some problems with Hayek’s analysis of the Anglo-American legal tradition
Keywords:
F. A. Hayek, theory of spontaneous order, common law, evolutionary theory of law, polycentrismAbstract
The theory of spontaneous order is widely regarded as one of the most important contributions of F.A. Hayek to the development of social sciences. Hayek’s main example of an emergent order is the classical (Medieval and Early Modern) common law. In his account, common law is not only a result of spontaneous evolution but also the main source of the unusual amount of freedom the early modern Englishman enjoyed compared to his European counterparts. In this paper I discuss some problems with Hayek’s analysis of the historical development of common law. In particular I criticize his claim that classical common law was based around precedents, and stress the surprising – given his economic views – lack of appreciation for the role competition between different courts played in the development of English law up until the nineteenth century. In conclusion I argue that polycentric legal order is the proper foundation for Hayek’s “constitution of liberty”.
References
Aranson P.H., Bruno Leoni in Retrospect, “Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy” 1988, t. 11, z. 3.
Baker J.H., The Common Law Tradition: Lawyers, Books and the Law, London 2000.
Barnett R., The Structure of Liberty. Justice and the Rule of Law, Oxford 2000.
Barry N., The Tradition of Spontaneous Order, “Literature of Liberty” 1982, t. 5, z. 2.
Benson B.L., The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law, “Southern Economic Journal” 1989, t. 55, z. 3.
Benson B.L., The Enterprise of Law. Justice Without the State, San Francisco 1990.
Benson B. L., To Serve and Protect. Privatization and Community in Criminal Justice, New York 1998.
Berman H., The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale, “The Yale Law Journal” 1994, t. 103, z. 7.
Berman H.J., Kaufman C., The Law of International Commercial Transactions (Lex Mercatoria), “Harvard International Law Review” 1978, t. 19, z. 1.
Block W., Defending the Undefendable. The Pimp, Prostitute, Scab, Slumlord, Libeler, Moneylender, and Other Scapegoats in the Rogue’s Gallery of American Society, Auburn 2008.
Boettke P.J., The Theory of Spontaneous Order and Cultural Evolution in the Social Theory of F.A. Hayek, “Cultural Dynamics” 1990, t. 3, z. 1.
Boettke P.J., Candela R.A., Rivalry, Polycentricism, and Institutional Evolution, “George Mason University Working Paper in Economics” 2014, n. 15-25.
Boudreaux D.J., The Essential Hayek, Vancouver 2014.
Bryan M., Early English Law Reporting, “University of Melburn Collections” 2009, z. 4.
Butler E., Hayek: His Contribution to the Political and Economic Thought of Our Time, London 1983.
Caplan B., Systematically Biased Beliefs About Economics: Robust Evidence of Judgemental Anomalies from the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy, “Economic Journal” 2002, t. 112, z. 479.
Caplan B., The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies. Princeton 2007.
Caplan B., Stringham E.P., Privatizing the Adjudication of Disputes, “Theoretical Inquiries in Law” 2008, t. 9, z. 3.
Christiansen G.B., Law as a Discovery Procedure, “Cato Journal” 1990, t. 9, z. 3.
Curott N.A., Stringham E.P., The Rise of Government Law Enforcement in England, [w:] The Pursuit of Justice. Law and Economics of Legal Institutions, red. E.J. López, New York 2010.
Dezalay Y., Garth B.G., Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and the Construction of a Transnational Legal Order, Chicago 1998.
Dizerga G., Outlining a New Paradigm, “Cosmos & Taxis. Studies in Emergent Order and Organization”, 2013, t. 1, z. 1.
Downs A., An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York 1957.
Friedman D D., The Machinery of Freedom. Guide to a Radical Capitalism, wyd. 3, New York 2014.
Gogłoza W., Policentryczny porządek konstytucyjny – zarys historii idei, [w:] Tendencje rozwojowe myśli politycznej i prawnej, red. M. Maciejewski, M. Marszał, M. Sadowski, Wrocław 2014.
Gogłoza W., Analityczny anarchizm – cele, przedmiot i metody badań empirycznych nad stanami natury, [w:] Myślenie o polityce i prawie – przedmiot, metoda, perspektywa, red. Barwicka-Tylek, A. Czarnecka, M. Jaskólski, J. Malczewski, Warszawa 2015.
Graver E., Leijonhufvud A., Rosten L., High J., Buchanan J., Bork R., Hazlett T., Al-chian A.A., Chitester R., Nobel Prize Winning Economist Friedrich A. von Hayek – Oral History, Los Angeles 1983.
Hayek F.A., The Use of Knowledge in Society, “American Economic Review” 1945, t. 35, z. 4.
Hayek F.A. von, Kinds of Order in Society, “New Individualist Review” 1964, t. 3, z. 2.
Hayek F.A. von, Law, Legislation and Liberty. A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and Political Economy, London 1998.
Hasnas J., Hayek, the Common Law, and Fluid Drive, “New York University Journal of Law and Liberty” 2005, t. 1, z. 1.
Holdsworth W., A History of English Law, t. 1. Methuen 1956.
Hoppe H.H., F.A. Hayek on Government and Social Evolution: A Critique, “The Review of Austrian Economics” 1994, t. 7, z. 1.
Horowitz S., From Smith to Menger to Hayek: Liberalism in the Spontaneous-Order Tradition, “The Independent Review” 2001, t. 6, z. 1.
Kerekes C.B., Williamson C.R., Discovering Law: Hayekian Competition in Medieval Iceland, “Griffith Law Review” 2012, t. 21, z. 2.
Klerman D., Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common Law, “University of Chicago Law Review” 2007, t. 74, z. 4.
Kostro K., Hayek kontra socjalizm. Debata socjalistyczna a rozwój teorii społeczno-ekonomicznych Friedricha Augusta von Hayeka, Warszawa 2001.
Leeson P.T., Do Markets Need Government?, [w:] The Legal Foundations of Free Markets, red. S.F. Copp, London 2008.
Leeson P.T., How Important is State Enforcement for Trade?, “American Law and Economics Review” 2008, t. 10, z. 1.
Leoni B., Freedom and the Law, wyd. 2, Los Angeles 1972.
Liggio L. P., Plamer T.G., Freedom and the Law: A Comment on Professor Arnarson’s Article, “Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy” 1988, t. 11, z. 3.
Lindgren J., Measuring diversity: Law Faculties in 1997 and 2013, “Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper” No. 15-07.
Milgrom P.R., North D.C., Weingast B.R., The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Medieval Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs, “Economics and Politics” 1990, t. 2, z. 1.
Neely R., Why Court Don’t Work, New York 1993.
O’Drisco G.P. ll, Economics as a Coordination Problem: The Contributions of Friedrich A. Hayek, Kansas City 1977.
Plucknett T.F.T., A Concise History of the Common Law, Indianapolis 2010.
Pocock J.G.A., The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study of English Historical Thought in the Seventeenth Century, Cambridge 1987.
Posner R.A., What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), “Supreme Court Economic Review” 1993, t. 3, z. 1.
Rosenkranz N.Q., Intellectual Diversity in the Legal Academy, “Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy” 2014, t. 37, z. 1.
Rothbard M.N., The Present State of Austrian Economics, “Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines” 1995, t. 6, z. 1.
Rowley C.K., The Common Law in Public Choice Perspective: A Theoretical and Institutional Critique, “Hamline Law Review” 1988-1989, z. 12.
Salerno, Ludwig von Mises as Social Rationalist, “The Review of Austrian Economics J. T.” 1990, t. 4, z. 1.
Sandefur T., Some Problems with Spontaneous Order, “The Independent Review” 2009, t. 14, z. 1.
Smith A., Badania nad naturą i przyczynami bogactwa narodów, tłum. B. Jasińska, Warszawa 2007.
Smith V.L., Racjonalność w ekonomii, Warszawa 2013.
Spruyt H., The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change, Princeton 1996.
Steele D.R., Hayek’s Theory of Cultural Grup Selection, “The Journal of Libertarian Studies” 1987, t. 8, z. 2.
Stringham E.P., Private Governance. Creating Order in Economic and Social Life, Oxford 2015.
Stringham E.P., Zywicki T.J., Rivalry and Superior Dispatch: An Analysis of Competing Courts in Medieval and Early Modern England, “Public Choice” 2011, t. 147, z. 3.
Stringham E.P., Zywicki T.J., Hayekian Anarchism, “Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization” 2011, t. 78, z. 3.
Sztaba S., Aktywne poszukiwanie renty. Teoria, przykłady historyczne, przejawy w polskiej gospodarce, Warszawa 2002.
Tullock G., The Case Against the Common Law, [w:] The Selected Works of Gordon Tullock: Law and Economics, red. C.K. Rowley, t. 9, Indianapolis 2005.
Zywicki T.J., The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply-Side Analysis, “George Mason University Law and Economics Working Paper Series” n. 02-21.
Zywicki T.J., Spontaneous Order and the Common law: Gordon Tullock’s Critique, “Public Choice” 2008, z. 135.
Zywicki T.J., Sanders A.B., Posner, Hayek, and the Economic Analysis of Law, “Iowa Law Review” 2008, z. 93.
Vong D., Biding Precedent and English Judicial Law-Making, “Jura Falconis” 1984-1985, t. 21, z. 3.
