Jeremy Bentham's Critique of Natural Rights

Abstract

The purpose of this paper, which employs a historical-analytical method, is to present a Benthamian critique of the concept of “natural right”, derived from natural law. This critique, which appears already in the philosopher’s early works, grows out of the conviction that the only source of rights is state law, positive law, made by people and for the people. Bentham is convinced that an individual can only have legal rights, which are necessarily coupled with the obligation of another subject and secured by a sanction – he is led to this conclusion by, among other things, an analysis of the language of law – a special way of studying legal terms, taking into account the entanglement of these terms in sentences.

Bentham’s critique of natural rights also stems from deeply utilitarian motives – natural rights, as they do not actually exist, do not provide an individual any rights, unlike the rights guaranteed by positive law. In Bentham’s view, natural right is a fiction that contributes to disagreements between those who lead debates about the law, and to conflict or even violence between those who try to implement natural rights. The eradication of the notion of natural right from the public debate about the law may be served by the codification of the law of England, which Bentham – a declared opponent of common law – sought throughout his life. The philosopher’s conviction that the effective realization of human rights can only be guaranteed by the power of state law, constitutions and statutes is shared by some modern thinkers.